I
launched high above the clouds and
filtering atmosphere on February
fourteen nineteen eighty the solar
maximum Observatory is a source of very
detailed information about the Sun for
the first nine months of the plan
two-year mission the satellite collected
spectacular new data hundreds of
scientists gathered at NASA's Goddard
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt
Maryland in a ground observatories
around the world to study the Sun and
solar flares scientists made numerous
discoveries and raised many new
questions about the Sun then in late
nineteen eighty-three fuses failed in
the attitude control subsystem module
this meant that the satellite could no
longer point precisely at the
observation areas on the Sun fortunately
solar max was the first of a new breed
of satellites build of standardized
components and designed to be repaired
in space the faulty attitude control
module is one of the three replaceable
box-like units that control power
command functions and the positioning of
the satellite these units are part of
the multi-mission modular spacecraft or
mms which makes up the lower portion of
the solar max satellite the upper
portion the observatory contains seven
different instruments for solar research
however a considerable amount of
planning and preparation had to be
accomplished before that repair could
occur the solar maximum repair mission
in 1984 chalked up a number of
spaceflight first
these successes were possible because of
some of the unique management approaches
and decisions made back in the late
1960s and early 1970s certainly there
must be some very interesting management
lessons learned from the mms and solar
max experience i'm dutch funny retreat
on behalf of the NASA program and
project management training and
development initiative now let's go to
Goddard Space Flight Center and get some
insight on the mms from frank cipollina
the project manager for the mms thanks
for joining us sepi what were some of
the more dominant management challenges
that allowed for the development of the
modular spacecraft well that's the most
dominant challenge was the desire to try
to fly more science at less cost and the
period of the late sixties inflation was
beginning to skyrocket the Apollo
program was coming down phasing down
along with it the budgets were dropping
off and yet from a scientific taste or
desire or flavor we were getting many
many good new missions to fly and
searching desperately to find the
dollars as an agency to fly those new
scientific missions and that was really
the challenge that we as a center try to
step up to since we are a scientific
Space Flight Center well how can you
answer a question like
well when I think back I am amazed at
how how it came out but in fact the the
aspects of answering it took four years
of very very hard work and an intense
team of experienced scientists and
engineers the den center director 1970
formalized such a team and challenge
them basically to look at what are the
elements of spacecraft cost and how
could we in fact reduce those costs that
team concentrated on looking at the
space crafts of the 1960s 150 280 some
odd spacecrafts the NASA designed built
and launched in that decade and they
focused not so much with the design
characteristics of the space crafts but
rather with the design characteristics
as how they related to cost and the cost
aspects and then finally with that
database we went to private industry and
we did some rather significant economic
studies focusing on design parameters as
a function of cost but what were some of
the findings of those studies well touch
there were four major findings of the
studies the first one not so surprising
said that in the period of the 60s we
did not have any significant commonality
of space crafts second findings said
that even though we had point design
spacecrafts within those space crafts
were in fact a lot of common boxes black
boxes equipment and the third finding
which was probably the most significant
from a cost containment point of view
was the fact that almost the vast
majority of the spacecraft developments
we were spending anywhere from thirty
three percent to sixty percent of the
total program costs in the integration
and test phase of the spacecraft that in
itself highlighted something that
perhaps we could deal with from new
spacecraft architecture new spacecraft
design
and in effect that really said we were
spending a lot of time reinventing the
spacecraft wheels when in fact the only
thing that was changing was the outside
architecture of the spacecraft the last
point was the point that kind of gave us
credence for multi mission capability
and that is that for most of those 150
to 180 missions many of those could be
synthesized into four different
performance categories and if somehow we
could design a spacecraft that could
meet the performance requirements of
those four categories we have the
essence of a system which would not
necessitate so to speak reinventing the
spacecraft for those four types of
missions but what was some of the
programmatic issues in the environment
that allowed for the acceptance of the
modular spacecraft concept Pat I guess
it could be summarized by one word
netword with skepticism there was a
tremendous amount of skepticism although
people saw economic studies saw the cost
benefits that am elated from those
studies the most significant problem
that we had was what we were proposing
was a revolutionary spacecraft and in
proposing a revolutionary spacecraft
there's always this fear that a it may
not work technically when it's once it's
put in orbit the risk is very high and
the second point is the fact that in the
development process it may not be
feasible to contain the cost growth you
may run into new technological problems
that had never been faced before so we
had to focus over that four or five year
period in dealing with our critics in
attempting to answer those four major
problems those questions of cost
containment out of skepticism of
performance of risk assessment risk
managed well sepi what was the influence
of Apollo and shuttle on your program at
that time I think we can best answer
that question if we walk up now to the
shuttlebay trainer and take a look at
our latest mms spacecraft that's been
delivered from the production line
now that we're up here dutch i think i
can better explain the impact and the
influences of both the Apollo and the
shuttle program had on our spacecraft
architecture perhaps the most single
critical dilemma that was posed to us in
the early 70s was the dilemma of having
to deal with how to shuttle eyes and
make our spacecraft systems serviceable
one of the most fundamental problems
that we had was that all our economic
studies were showing study after study
after study the advantages from a cost
control point of view and a foremost
serviceability point of view of
repairing servicing changing out
payloads on orbit for these spacecrafts
by the same token the experience factor
that the agency had had on the Apollo
program was the very high cost of man
rating equipment and our customers view
this as a is basically a very serious
cost control problem and we had to hit
this problem very hard and we had to hit
it hard head on and deal with it and I'm
point by point basis what we did
basically was to rely very heavily on a
very significant series of economic
studies to delte not so much with
serviceability but with how to build a
lower-cost better architectured
multi-mission type of spacecraft system
and what we did with our customers was
convince them that whether we serviced
on orbit or not whether we launched on
the shuttle are launched on a
conventional launch vehicle and our
spacecraft was architecture to fly
either way fly on a delta fly on a Titan
or even or fly on the shuttle regardless
of the method of launch regardless of
whether one considered serviceability or
not the architecture of the spacecraft
was such that it's economies were
significantly lower by virtue of the
fact that we in fact did make it modular
and easy to assemble and test on the
ground and therefore because we reduce
that integration in Tesla a time
we were able to save some thirty to
forty percent of a typical program
caused by negating the need for first of
all redeveloping of the spacecraft and
then shortening typical space graphs
integration and test time with the
observatory instruments and that was the
fundamental approach by which we hit
this problem and eventually I think that
particular approach did persist and we
were finally able to convince our
customers so that was the better way to
go well sepi what were some of the
aspects of those economic studies well
there were eight economic studies run
during the nineteen seventy-two 1975
period and the majority of the economic
studies dealt with the level of
spacecraft modularity from an economic
point of view from a lower cost possible
point of view we dealt with trying to
understand the economic implication of
making an entire spacecraft modular and
throw away able replaceable at the
spacecraft level the next level down was
at the subsystem level and then we
looked at the individual component
modularity that is making individual
components removable and replaceable the
most significant economic study of all
that is when i say significant i mean
that had the most impact and influence
with our potential customers was the
Aerospace Corporation study that dealt
not with servicing but with the economic
benefits associated with having a
standard modular spacecraft that could
accommodate four or five different sets
of missions without redevelopment and
that could be assembled by virtue of its
modularity on the ground significantly
faster and therefore less expensive that
study highlighted the key that our
customers were really looking for the
potential of a thirty to forty percent
savings for each of the specific
missions that would use a so-called
standard or common spacecraft bus well
what were some of the conclusions of
those studies the the conclusions
especially the aerospace conclusion led
our customers to forget about the
sort of speak the risks associated with
servicing they sort of put servicing
requirements out of their mind and it
was very nice for them to say we won't
do anything to preclude servicing but by
the same token we won't have to spend
any money at making a system serviceable
because modularity and rapid ground
integration and test breeds ease of
servicing on orbit and I think of all
the conclusions of one could draw that
was the one that really put the message
across to our customers and everybody
could sort of speak be the Maytag could
watch the Maytag repairmen leaning on
his washing machine and should the day
ever arise that we did have to conduct
an emergency repair maintenance the
system could in fact be compatible to do
it well semi wasn't really difficult
selling upper management well I guess I
would have to say yes and so it took us
five years to do that I think that in
looking back in the process of trying to
convince upper management we had to deal
with some very specific questions and
convince the upper management at NASA
headquarters that this plunge was was
worth was worth their investment and was
worth taking a risk to do and the way we
did that was first of all find that
first willing customer that first
program who by either necessity or by
cost constraints was willing to join
with us and that program happened to be
the solar max mission spacecraft program
the process by which we sold them on the
approach was first of all we convinced
them that we could launch on any launch
vehicle that we did not have to wait for
the shuttle we could launch on a delta
or a Titan and the next process was the
process of invincible risk by virtue of
the amount of breadboarding and
Technology testing we were doing here on
the ground and got it over this five
year period
the last aspect had to do with our
convincing null hinners that from a
solar max observatory point of view from
an agency point of view from a
futuristic thinking that on-orbit
servicing down the pike a modular
spacecraft up front more economical
approach for not just a solar max
mission but for landsat missions and
future uars missions and so on that a
common spacecraft that could take care
of four or five different types of
mission constraints requirements and
configurations would be best for the
agency and no hitters had the wisdom to
step up to that and said yes we will
take the plunge we will go with this
process
we're fortunate to have with us today
dr. Nowell Henner's the associate deputy
administrator of NASA and dr. Anthony
kallio the vice president for management
and operations at the planning research
corporation in October of 1976 dr.
Henner's the god ur team working a new
breed of spacecraft called the
multi-mission modular spacecraft came to
NASA headquarters to see if they can get
a decision to use the solar maximum
mission with the mms spacecraft what
were some of the factors that you had to
consider in making that decision touch
when the goddard folks came down to
headquarters talking about the mms
approach right off the bat it was more
than just the solar max mission they do
realize that I had a potential for lots
of missions and in fact that was one of
the benefits being advertised for the
mms approach that you use the same basic
design for many missions I'll come back
to that we had though at the time
something called the low-cost systems
office under the chief engineer Walt
Williams at that time they did the basic
economic studies of the mms and
concluded that if you were to do just
one you wouldn't really reap the
benefits of it but that if you could buy
a block of four or five spacecraft
that's what you'd really see the return
on the investment now we realize that
the intangibles were going to save money
also not just the acquisition but the
the common design common components the
sparing philosophy the fact that the
modular approach the serviceability
would let you do the testing on the
ground and a lot easier way than
typically from the inside out but then
we came up against our friends over at
OMB the office of management and budget
they understood the concept and said
fine we'll let you go ahead with the
solar max mission and the mms but we're
not going to approve a block by a five
spacecraft their argument was that we
didn't have mission approval for the
other four spacecraft even though we
could say we know things are coming
downstream we typically get a new
mission approved every year that didn't
wash with them so they r approved the
only for the solar
max mission at that time and Lance I
just had to wait till his time came in
the Landsat subject brings us to dr.
Kelly at the time you are working with
dr. hunters on this project but we're
not yet the associate administrator for
Earth applications the office that would
later have responsibility for that
spacecraft now where were some of the
considerations that you had to make in
this decision in that timeframe October
76 I believe one of the problems that
was going on with a another budget issue
and even though all of us trained by
NASA or know the importance of balancing
performance cost and schedule a Landsat
was having a difficult time with the
office of management and budget because
the project was not approved the way it
was originally proposed by NASA that was
to carry two instruments a multispectral
scanner which was the old instrument and
a new thematic mapper it was believed at
that point in time that if it was an
experimental program that the thematic
mapper was the only instrument was that
was needed and the multispectral scanner
was not needed so there was the project
was in the throes of being redefined as
to between Earth NASA and the office of
management budget so it was unclear what
the spacecraft design would be secondly
if we had to go to such a design for any
spacecraft whether it was a space
science or an application spacecraft it
would have to be dual compatible because
if it were to fly on the shuttle
ultimately it would also have to in the
in the early years fly on a expendable
launch vehicle and then finally for
those who were interested in polar
orbits we would have to fly out of the
Western test range that it'd have to be
compatibility with that facility so this
presented a number of uncertainties for
a whole series and of a spacecraft that
were being considered at that period of
time well in summary considering that
whole time frame from 76 on to when
solar max flu what kind of lessons
learned can you share with the current
and new managers within NASA well the
gutter team back in 77 as they have
in the past continue to be had a great
ideas and the idea of the multi-mission
spacecraft was a very creative one and
the second part of it was they were very
persistent with that whole notion of
getting the multi-mission spacecraft
phone I was not a supporter at the time
and it turned out through their bright
ideas and their persistence or tenacity
persevered and we got to see in the
nineteen eighty-four timeframe for the
recovery of a solar max mission and its
retrofitting and placing it back in the
service that the concept that they had a
good concept well thought out well
engineered with the persistence of that
team is leading the way for the future
to the space station in this shuttle so
it was a good idea and with good ideas
staying with that I think is an
important point for NASA engineers to
consider what doctor enters what kind of
summary lessons learned would you like
to pass on to the new managers Dutch I
think there are a number there Tony
touched on on several of them clearly
having a solid technical product to sell
has to be number one without that forget
it then once you get past that you've
got to have a salesman and I'll put it
that way you're out there in the field
you've got to come in and convince a
range of people here at headquarters and
organizations first you've got the
program office I say the program office
that's your first customer but then on
something like the mms which went across
many program officers you had to touch
base with many and get people to
understand that there was a payoff and
coming together on something like the
mms then you had to work the controllers
office you had to work the low-cost
systems office and you had to get over
and work OMB so you've got to understand
when you're out in the field that you
can't go to one point head coach but
you've gotta play across the board and
aggregate the support for what you're
trying to do Tony mentioned being
tenacious in this project I think you've
seen all mostly the ultimate tenacious
yes a leader
and it's epi we've got that sepia is a
bulldog I could still feel that Keith
marks up here in the neck he doesn't
like old sepi so believed that what he
was doing was right after spending a
while with him he just fell in said yeah
he's right the other thing he did of
course and his team was that they
produced they promised a certain product
on a schedule and they brought it in and
we're seeing that now through the rest
of the program even though we started
with just solarmax it did get used for
landsat it became used on the upper
atmosphere research satellite there are
components of it modules on the gamma
ray observatory and there are pieces of
it in the space telescope and it really
has formed the basis for a lot of our
thinking on the polar platform for the
space station there's one last thing the
Goddard management at the time came
Seppi a lot of leeway in the project
they believed in and said go to it so it
was an environment which encouraged that
innovation and that's something we've
got to be sure we keep up so these
bright ideas can surface in the system
get through it gets old thank you very
much dr. Henner's and dr. Kelly no i'm
sure that the nasa work for us and
specially the young NASA managers have a
better appreciation for how management
decisions are made at the associate
administrator level thank you very much
and now let's go to Goddard Space Flight
Center and see the multi-mission modular
spacecraft well semi what was the impact
of the failure of the solar max
spacecraft on your program well looking
back in time I feel that the impact of
solar max failure in fact the fine
pointing failure of the attitude control
subsystem represented both a tragedy in
a triumph a tragedy in the sense that we
launched the spacecraft with two years
of observation objectives and after the
first year we lost our fine pointing we
had all the solar physicists and
ground-based observatories all over the
world making simultaneous observations
with the solar max physicist here at
Goddard to
to uncover some of the big secrets of
solar flare theory when we lost by
appointing we lost much of that
capability and I think that was
certainly an adversity on the other hand
by virtue of the fact that we have
designed the spacecraft which in fact
was serviceable on orbit since we had
built this flight support system to go
up and take care of that problem and
since we had a desire as an agency to
basically put our faith in the
transportation system which we said
could do repair and should do repair of
satellites in orbit we put all those
aspects together just doing going for it
represented a confidence represented an
objective for the agency of meeting its
goal of understanding where the
development of resources and what their
intention was in the first place and
bringing all elements of the agency
together the manned spaceflight
transportation element the scientist the
observatory builders bringing them all
together and doing a very successful
repair mission represented a significant
triumph and all that one has to do is
look at what happened in the next 12
months after the successful solar max
repair mission first of all we did
retrieved two spacecrafts Westar and
palapa both of which are going to be
relaunched next we repaired sin com4 and
put it up into orbit into its
operational regime or it's working fine
to this day solar max which was repaired
in 1984 is working fine and still
collecting very valuable scientific data
and in fact for the last four and a half
to five years he has been operating fine
and being able to collect some
significant scientific data as the solar
cycle is going back up and I think you
put all those aspects together it
represented this this triumph aspect as
well as the adversity ass
what's that be looking back to nineteen
seventy when your challenge was to get
more science for less cost what advice
can you give your new project managers
and what have you learned well I think
in terms of what have we learned and
what the accomplishments have been
looking back and looking first of all
here at UA RS which represents the sixth
or seventh production spacecraft common
to several different missions and even
more importantly the fact that this
particular ACS subsystem was the one
that flew for four years on solar max
was brought back from space and
refurbished twenty-five to thirty
percent of the cost of a new spacecraft
and now we'll be flying again on a
spacecraft almost three times more
complicated and expensive I think that
that basically is indicative of the fact
that we have accomplished the goal of
reducing cost of future missions by
virtue of our being able to build and
serve as common modular spacecrafts on
the ground and and relaunch and maintain
some form of a standard spacecraft
production base and I think that that I
feel very good about that accomplishment
I think as far as the the lessons
learned for future project managers the
most fundamental reality today is that
the cost pressures of the 80s and the
90s are even more severe than the cost
pressures of the 70s and for a project
manager to effectively be able to cost
manage and schedule manager program he's
got to be dogmatically pragmatic he's
got to make hard decisions on trade-offs
between cost and performance and
schedule and those trade-offs have to be
made in a rather timely fashion today
much more so I believed and they were in
a period of the 70s I think that by the
same token that project manager today
has to be an astute philosophical leader
he cannot be afraid
of basically grabbing the cutting edge
of technology in any given area whether
it be in the scientific instrument area
or in the spacecraft performance area
and moving ahead with that technology
without fear he's got to be determined
he's got to be an astute philosophical
leader and he's got to bring his team
along with them in order to make true
progress in this space arena project
management is really a bottom line art
form of leading a group of technical and
business people into accomplishing a
common goal and that the success that a
project manager can have is directly
dependent on what I call the three P's
of project management persistence
patience and people dedication project
managers got to have that goal he's got
to have a fervent desire and demonstrate
that fervent desire of accomplishing
that goal and finally touch the most
important point of all is that a project
manager cannot succeed unless he can
inspire his team of technical and
business experts to follow him and
that's what project management i think
is all about well suppy thank you very
much for your help and your guidance and
wisdom and on behalf of the NASA program
and project management training and
development initiative one thank you and
your Goddard team and the NASA
headquarters team for making this
training film possible well that's thank
you very much I thoroughly enjoyed it it
was idea thank you thank you you have
just seen a NASA pilot video program
prepared as part of the program and
project management training and
development initiative this video series
is intended to be a vehicle to which
former and present NASA managers can
share their experiences with other
employees especially those interested in
management the video programs in this
series focus on the exchange of
approaches in the informal communication
of various NASA project management
styles the video programs are geared to
gathering and sharing the individual and
team experiences and lessons learned and
the managers of past NASA projects
hopefully these experiences will be
useful to the future cadre of managers
each program in the series will document
one project in an educational format
containing a brief history or summary of
the project followed by a discussion on
how these people managed and overcame
their program obstacles the audience
will be introduced to different
real-life project scenarios and through
the videos will better understand why
certain management approaches were
selected and why some styles have been
more successful than others each program
will discuss detailed information about
the project's objectives and history is
told by the project managers themselves
the audience for the series is the NASA
program and project management workforce
especially the new less experienced
managers who may not be familiar with
the details of past projects this
program will bring together NASA's
seasoned professionals and capture many
of their projects in brief visual
learning sessions which will be made
available to a broad audience we hope
this series will aid in the development
of a corporate memory that will benefit
both current and future generations of
NASA personnel thanks for listening and
be sure to watch for the next video
program in this series